LongYear uses cutting-edge vetKeys technology for verifiably encrypted threshold key derivation, ensuring your whistleblower reports are protected by cryptographic guarantees.
At the core of vetKeys there is a cryptographic protocol called verifiably encrypted threshold Key Derivation (vetKD). To understand how vetKeys work, it's helpful to first unpack the meaning of each part of this protocol's name:
A process to derive new cryptographic keys from an existing master key.
The protocol uses threshold cryptography, meaning the master key is not held by a single party. Instead, it is split among multiple nodes. A quorum of nodes must cooperate to derive new keys.
Users can supply an encryption (transport) public key, which is used to securely deliver the derived key. The derived key is encrypted at all times, including during intermediate steps.
The protocol provides cryptographic guarantees that the encrypted derived key is correct and has not been tampered with. It's publicly verifiable that the derived key was correctly computed.
The Internet Computer integrates the vetKD protocol as a threshold key derivation service operated by vetKD-enabled subnets. The protocol involves three main actors:
Typically interacting through a dapp frontend. They request derived keys and provide a public key for secure delivery.
Perform access control and forward user requests to the vetKD protocol using the system API.
Execute the key derivation protocol, each using its share of the vetKD master key.
The user generates a fresh key pair, referred to as a transport key pair. The public key is sent to the canister to be used for encrypting the derived key. The user may also supply input arguments that determine the derived key.
The canister authenticates the user and enforces access control policies. If authorized, the canister invokes the vetKD system API, specifying context, input, transport public key, and master key ID.
All nodes in the designated vetKD subnet run the threshold key derivation protocol. Each node computes an encrypted share of the derived key, and once a quorum is available, the shares are combined into a single encrypted derived key.
The user verifies that the key is valid and corresponds to the provided context and input. If verification passes, the user decrypts the result using their private key.
To enable secure threshold key derivation, each vetKD master key is generated and maintained by the nodes of a dedicated subnet. For fault tolerance and resilience, the master key is also backed up on at least one additional subnet so it can be restored in the event of subnet failure or recovery.
To eliminate single points of failure and ensure that the master key remains decentralized at all times, a distributed key generation (DKG) protocol is used. The Internet Computer uses Jens Groth's non-interactive DKG protocol, which offers several important advantages:
This advanced cryptographic foundation ensures that your whistleblower reports are protected by mathematical guarantees, not just promises.
With threshold cryptography, no single node or entity can compromise your data. Multiple independent parties must cooperate, ensuring true decentralization.
Every encryption operation is verifiable, meaning you can mathematically prove that your data was handled correctly and hasn't been tampered with.